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Abstract: Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to 
you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. 
Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are 
composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this paper we 
critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to 
think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were so 
composed, this underlying disunity in metaphysical or psychological structure would fall 
below the threshold of epistemic significance.  
 
Suppose you look around. You have a visual experience as of a red light ahead. It 
visually seems to you that there is a red light ahead. How are these related? A natural idea 
is that they are identical: for it to visually seem to you that there is a red light ahead is for 
you to have a visual experience part of whose content is that there is a red light ahead.  
         One might say the same about other sorts of experiences and perceptual 
seemings—e.g. tactile, auditory, etc. We call this conception of perceptual seemings the 
Identity View and give it the following general formulation: 
  
Identity View:  For it to perceptually seem to you that p is for you to have a 
sensory experience part of whose content is that p.1 
  
The identity between visual seemings and visual experiences can be expressed by 
replacing ‘perceptually’ with ‘visually’ and ‘sensory’ with ‘visual.’ The identities 
between other kinds of perceptual seemings and other kinds of sensory experiences can 
be expressed by making similar replacements. 
         The Identity View is not trivial. An increasing number of epistemologists deny it. 
According to them for it to visually seem to you that there is a red light ahead is for you 
to have a visual experience, maybe part of whose content is that there is a red light ahead, 
and for it to seem to you that there is a red light ahead and for these to be suitably related.  
         Again, one might say the same about other sorts of experiences and perceptual 
seemings—e.g. tactile, auditory, etc. We call this conception of perceptual seemings the 
Composition View and give it the following general formulation: 
  
Composition View: For it to perceptually seem to you that p is for you to have a 
sensory experience, maybe part of whose content is that p, and for it to seem to 
you that p and for these to be suitably related. 
  
As above, the distinctness of visual seemings and visual experiences can be expressed by 
replacing ‘perceptually’ with ‘visually’ and ‘sensory’ with ‘visual.’ And the distinctness 
of other kinds of perceptual seemings and other kinds of sensory experiences can be 
expressed by making similar replacements. We say more about what the Composition 
View amounts to and who is committed to it in the first section below.  
Our aim in this paper is twofold. First, we will argue that there are no compelling 
reasons to endorse the Composition View over the Identity View. Second, we will argue 
that even if the Composition View turns out to be correct, it has limited implications for 
epistemology. Here is a brief explanation of what we have in mind. Suppose you see that 
p. If the Composition View is true, then this visual state is metaphysically disunified: 
there is a visual experience and a seeming and these are distinct. Let’s say that the visual 
state is, furthermore, epistemically disunified just in case the perceptual justification you 
acquire from it derives either from the visual experience or from the seeming but not 
from both. We will argue that even if the Composition View turns out to be correct, it 
does not provide any reason to think perceptual states are epistemically disunified. 
 
1.  More on the Composition View  
 
In this section we make three clarifications about the Composition View.  
First, the terminology we have used is not standard. There is no standard 
terminology yet, and we find ours natural enough. Any development of the Composition 
View will identify three things: the composite state and its two components. We are using 
‘perceptual seeming’ for the composite state and ‘sensory experience’ and ‘seeming’ for 
its two components. Other writers use different terms for these. The following brief 
survey will serve to identify some proponents of the Composition View, some variations 
in the terminology they use, and some differences in how they conceive of its elements.   
Jack Lyons is a proponent of the Composition View. He uses ‘perceptual 
experience’ for the composite state, and calls its two components ‘seemings’ and 
‘sensations.’ He writes, ‘let us use “sensations” to pick out the states with the rich, non-
conceptual phenomenology distinctive of perceptual experience...Seeming happens later, 
in different brain areas, and involves the digitization, classification and interpretation of 
the information extracted in the earlier processing stages into conceptual terms...One 
could have sensations without their associated seemings and vice versa’ (2015, 156). 
Chris Tucker also endorses the Composition View using the same terminology: 
‘“perceptual experience” is best understood as picking out the composite of a sensation 
and an accompanying seeming’ (2010, 532). 
John Bengson, Enrico Grube, and Daniel Korman (2011,169) do not commit to 
the Composition View as we understand it, but they do draw related distinctions. They 
distinguish between a ‘perceptual experience...which relates a subject to a propositional 
content’ and ‘[a state of] sensory awareness...which relates a subject not to a 
propositional content, but to a property, relation, or individual.’ One approach to 
developing a Composition View is to take their perceptual experiences as the composite 
states and their states of sensory awareness as one of the component states. Different 
versions of this approach can pursue different ideas about what you have to add to a state 
of sensory awareness to get a perceptual experience.  
Earl Conee and Berit Brogaard also endorse versions of the Composition View. 
Conee argues that when the proposition that p seems true to S, S possesses some evidence 
for p and S has a certain sort of inclination to ‘regard some mental event of S’s as 
presenting the truth of the content proposition’ (2013, 54). Conee thinks that sensations 
rather than seemings do the primary justificatory work in cases of perceptual seeming. 
Brogaard argues that ‘perceptual states and states of seemings are different kinds of 
mental states’ (2013a, 37). On her view, a composite state of perceptual seeming is built 
out of a ‘perceptual experience’ and an accompanying ‘interpretation’ of that experience 
(2013b, f7).2 
Some writers use ‘perceptual seeming’ in a way that makes their commitment to 
the Composition View unclear. Michael Bergmann, for example, says ‘perceptual 
seemings are distinct from sensory experiences’ and ‘the sensory experience and the 
seeming that produces it are constantly conjoined’ (2013, 157-8). But Bergmann 
distances himself from those who ‘conflate seemings and sensory experiences into one 
thing they call a ‘perceptual seeming’ (2013, 159). Moreover, Andrew Cullison (2013) 
argues that perceptual seemings are caused by sensory experiences, but a sensory 
experience is not a proper part of a perceptual seeming. He thinks there is a causal 
relation between sensory experiences and seemings, but not a constitutive one. On one 
reading Bergmann and Cullison are proponents of the Composition View who use 
‘perceptual seeming’ for a component state rather than the composite state. On another 
reading, they are adopting another view altogether. We take a relaxed view toward what 
it takes for there to be composition and so are happy to count them as proponents of the 
Composition View as we understand it.  
The second clarification is about why we have qualified our formulation of the 
Composition View: a perceptual seeming that p includes a sensory experience, maybe 
part of whose content is that p. The reason for the qualifier ‘maybe’ is to allow for two 
possibilities.  
Some proponents think both perceptual seemings and sensory experiences have 
contents but that they need not match. Brogaard, for instance, says, ‘If I am giving a talk 
to fifty-four people, my perceptual experience, if veridical, represents fifty-four people in 
the room but it doesn’t phenomenally seem to me that there are fifty-four people in the 
room. At best, it seems to me that there are many people or more than twenty people or 
fewer than one hundred people in the room’ (2013b, 276). Tucker writes: ‘I am happily 
committed to the claim that seemings have propositional content, and I often will talk as 
if sensations also have some sort of representational content’ (2010, f7) and ‘one can 
have a sensation and yet have a seeming with some unrelated content’ (2010, f13).  
The ‘maybe’ qualifier is intended to capture another possibility as well: one might 
think sensations lack propositional content. For example, one might conceive of them as 
Bengson, Grube, and Korman conceive of what they call states of sensory awareness. 
Cullison also thinks that sensations lack propositional content. On his view sensations, 
perceptual experiences, and ‘raw feels’ all amount to the same thing and, he says, 
‘Seemings should be part of the non-conceptualists’ strategy for arguing that we confuse 
perceptual experiences with other contentful mental states that are intimately connected 
to perceptual experiences’ (2013, 37). 
The third clarification about the Composition View is that our formulation does 
not rule out the possibility of mere seemings. Perhaps sometimes it could just seem to 
you that p—but not visually, aurally, tactually, etc. Cullison, for instance, argues, 
‘Something can seem true to someone without that person having a sensory experience’ 
(2013, 37). Given how we are using the term ‘perceptual seeming’ we would not call 
such a mere seeming a perceptual seeming. Other writers use different terms for them. 
Huemer calls them ‘qualia free seemings’ (2013, 333), Tooley discusses seemings that 
lack ‘non-cognitive qualia’ (2013, 21), and Audi talks about ‘source-independent’ 
seemings (2013, 189). Audi adds: 
 
Suppose that, when realizing someone may wonder why I believe p, I rationalize 
p by saying to myself, ‘It seems true to me,’ where a proposition’s seeming true to 
me is constituted simply by a seeming that p, embodying the relevant kind of 
affirmative sense toward it. If there is nothing more to say that connects the 
seeming to a source like perception, I would surely have failed. (193)      
 
We are sympathetic. As proponents of the Identity View we do not think that such mere 
seemings are components of perceptual seemings. They are a different sort of mental 
state—either reducible to inclinations to believe or irreducible and sui generis. One of our 
main motivations for writing this paper is to isolate the view that perceptual seemings are 
justifiers from the view that mere seemings might be justifiers. More on this in section 3.  
 
2.  Against the Composition View 
 
Arguments for the Composition View generally take the form of proposals about 
how best to think about perceptual seemings after abandoning the Identity View. 
Arguments against the Identity View do the heavy dialectical lifting. So in this section we 
critically review the main considerations that have been given against the Identity View. 
If these considerations fail, then there is no reason to adopt the Composition View.  
We will formulate the considerations using our own terminology. And we will 
focus on the case of visual perception. So each consideration will take the form of an 
argument that visual seemings should be distinguished from visual experiences. We will 
talk about visual experiences as if they had propositional contents. So we will say things 
like ‘suppose you have a visual experience part of whose content is that p.’ We invite 
those proponents of the Composition View who deny that visual experiences have 
propositional contents to replace such formulations with their preferred alternatives. For 
example: ‘suppose you have a visual experience that makes you aware of qualities 
typifying states of affairs in which p’ or ‘suppose you have a visual experience that has a 
p-ish feel to it.’   
We distinguish three paradigm arguments, all of which conclude that the Identity 
View is false: the speckled hen argument, the expert/novice argument, and the blindsight 
argument. Others to be found in the literature are variants of these.  
 Here is the speckled hen argument:  
  
(1)  When you see a hen with 48 speckles you have a visual experience part of 
whose content is that there is a hen with 48 speckles. 
(2)  But when you see a hen with 48 speckles it does not visually seem to you that 
there is a hen with 48 speckles.3 
 
There are a few ways to respond to this argument. Both premises are questionable.  
On the one hand, when you see a hen with 48 speckles you might have a visual 
experience part of whose content is that there is a hen with a speckle there1, and a speckle 
there2, and a speckle there3… and a speckle there48 without having a visual experience 
part of whose content is that there is a hen with 48 speckles. The proposition that there is 
a hen with a speckle there1, and a speckle there2, and a speckle there3… and a speckle 
there48 entails the proposition that there is a hen with 48 speckles. However, in general 
even if p entails q one might represent that p without representing that q. So, having a 
visual experience part of whose content is that there is a hen with a speckle there1, and a 
speckle there2, and a speckle there3… and a speckle there48 does not imply having a 
visual experience part of whose content is that there is a hen with 48 speckles. The 
significance of this is that it is possible to explain the phenomenal difference between 
seeing a hen with 48 speckles and a hen with 47 or 49 speckles by appealing to the 
content of the visual experience, but this content need not be that there is a hen with 48 
speckles as opposed to a hen with 47 or 49 speckles.  
On the other hand, why not think that when you see a hen with 48 speckles it does 
visually seem to you that there is a hen with 48 speckles? One point is that you are not 
inclined to believe there is a hen with 48 speckles. But arguably visual seemings are 
distinct from inclinations to believe, and they do not necessarily imply inclinations to 
believe (even if, as a matter of fact, they often produce such inclinations).4 Another point 
is that if you do wind up forming the belief that there is a hen with 48 speckles, it would 
be unjustified, and so you must lack the relevant visual seeming. But this is doxastic 
justification. Maybe you do have propositional justification for such content but cannot 
properly base a belief on it.5 A final point is that perhaps visual seemings must be explicit 
in the sense that the content of a visual seeming is fully articulable (either in thought or 
through a verbal report) by its subject. Bengson argues that all seemings are like this.6 If 
this is a stipulative claim, then Bengson’s usage of ‘seeming’ differs from ours. If this is 
not a stipulative claim—if the meaning of ‘seeming’ is anchored by pointing to examples 
such as visual seemings, aural seemings, tactile seemings, etc—then one might think 
Bengson’s claim is rendered implausible by the very case under discussion. Of course 
whether one does think this depends on one’s stance with respect to the Identity View. 
But that just shows we do not have an independent consideration against that view here.  
In schematic form the expert/novice argument goes like this:  
 
(3) When an expert and a novice look at an F they have visual experiences with 
the same content. 
(4) But it visually seems to the expert that there is an F and it does not visually 
seem to the novice that there is an F. 
 
Different versions of the argument fill out the schema with different examples.7 Here is 
one from Tucker:  
 
Suppose you and I are looking at the face of some person who, unbeknownst to 
you, happens to be my wife. We would have a mental ‘picture’ of her in our 
minds. This ‘picture’ might look and feel exactly the same to us, i.e., our mental 
images of my wife would be phenomenally identical. These phenomenally 
identical images are (visual) sensations. Although there is no phenomenal 
difference with respect to our sensations, there is a phenomenal difference in the 
way things seem. It would seem utterly obvious to me that she is my wife. On the 
other hand, it would not seem to you that she is my wife, and if anything, it would 
seem utterly obvious to you that you have no idea who you are looking at. Despite 
having phenomenally identical sensations, we have different seemings. A 
plausible explanation is that seemings are not identical to sensations. (2013, 7) 
 
In this case Tucker is the expert. Premise (3) becomes: when he and we novices look at 
his wife’s face we have visual experiences as of a face with the same visible 
characteristics. And premise (4) becomes: but while it visually seems to him that the seen 
face is his wife’s, it does not visually seem to us that the seen face is his wife’s.   
 Some philosophers believe that visual experiences have high-level contents.8 If 
they do, then that provides grounds for rejecting premise (3). The idea is that Tucker and 
we have visual experiences with similar low-level contents but different high-level 
contents. Tucker’s visual experience includes as part of its content that the seen face is 
his wife’s. Our visual experiences do not include this proposition as part of their content. 
And in general: experts and novices have visual experiences with contents that largely 
overlap—hence the manifest similarity—but expert visual experiences represent high-
level contents that novice visual experiences do not.  
One way to reject this line of thought is to reject the view that visual experiences 
have high-level contents. But if this is one’s strategy, then why accept premise (4)? In 
general the expert will say that it seems to him or her that there is an F and the novice 
will not say this. But why take this to be evidence about the contents of visual seemings 
rather than the contents of inclinations to believe? Presumably there are some further 
considerations. For example, maybe there is a visual phenomenal contrast that could not 
be accounted for by a difference in inclinations to believe.9 Or maybe the case can be set 
up so that even though it seems to the expert that there is an F, the expert is not inclined 
to believe that there is an F.10 But if one takes these considerations to be cogent, then 
plausibly one shouldn’t reject the view that visual experiences have high-level contents.  
The proponent of the expert/novice argument faces a dilemma. Either the sorts of 
considerations favoring the view that visual experiences have high-level content are 
cogent or they are not. If they are, then premise (3) is problematic. If they are not, then 
premise (4) is problematic. Presumably proponents of the Composition View want to say 
that the considerations are cogent—but count in favor of attributing high-level contents to 
visual seemings as opposed to visual experiences.11 But it is difficult to see how the 
relevant considerations provide independent support for portioning out contents across 
distinct mental states.12  
Finally, here is the blindsight argument:13  
  
(5) If a blindsighter judges there to be an F in his or her blind spot, it is because it 
visually seems to him or her that there is an F there. 
(6) But a blindsighter does not have a visual experience part of whose content is 
that there is an F in his or her blind spot. 
 
We take (6) to be uncontroversially true—a blindsighter lacks visual phenomenology in 
his or her blind spot. But we find (5) to be quite puzzling.  
By almost all accounts visual seemings are phenomenally conscious.14 But the 
informational states that enable blind-sighted judgment have generally been construed as 
paradigm examples of phenomenally unconscious—though perhaps, at least in imaginary 
cases, access conscious—mental states.15,16 Moreover, blindsighters typically report that 
they are randomly guessing what is in their blind spots rather than having visual seemings 
that support their responses to questions.17 We see no reason to think that it visually 
seems to the blindsighter that there is an F.  
Suppose however that it does in some sense seem to the blindsighter that there is 
an F in his or her blind spot, and this seeming is somehow phenomenally conscious. 
Huemer, for instance, argues that a blindsighter may have a slightly elevated degree of 
belief that there is an F in the blind area because it ‘(slightly) seems that way’ (2013, 
333).18 This would be a mere seeming. Proponents of the Composition View might very 
well agree. But they would add: visual seemings just are mere seemings plus the 
appropriate relation to visual experience. So on their view there is the same intrinsic 
mental state and it is distinct from a visual experience. This addition begs the question 
however. We have been given no independent reason to think that visual seemings just 
are mere seemings plus the appropriate relation to visual experience—i.e. no independent 
reason for what amounts to the Composition View.   
 
3.  Epistemic Unity 
 
Despite the forgoing some philosophers might still be attracted to the 
Composition View. The question we want to pursue in this section is this: supposing the 
Composition View were true, what significance might it have for the epistemology of 
perception, and in particular the epistemology of perception embraced by dogmatists and 
phenomenal conservatives.  
According to James Pryor, ‘whenever you have an experience as of p, you thereby 
have immediate prima facie justification for believing p.’19 According to Michael 
Huemer, ‘if it seems to S as if P, then S thereby has at least prima facie justification for 
believing that P.’20 These are the sorts of views about the epistemology of perception that 
we have in mind. But for our purposes a weaker thesis will suffice: in at least some cases, 
if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have prima facie justification for 
believing that p. Call this Weak Dogmatism.  
Consider, then, the Composition View and Weak Dogmatism together:   
 
Composition View: For it to perceptually seem to you that p is for you to have a 
sensory experience, maybe part of whose content is that p, and for it to seem to 
you that p and for these to be suitably related. 
 
Weak Dogmatism: In at least some cases, if it perceptually seems to you that p, 
then you thereby have prima facie justification for believing that p. 
  
If one accepts both views, then a natural question to ask is: what part of the perceptual 
seeming does the ‘thereby’ in Weak Dogmatism refer back to—the sensory experience or 
the seeming? Let’s call whatever the ‘thereby’ in Weak Dogmatism refers back to a 
perceptual justifier. The question, then, is: what are perceptual justifiers—sensory 
experiences or seemings?  
Epistemologists disagree about this. Some writers, e.g. Earl Conee, argue that 
perceptual justifiers are sensory experiences.21 Other writers, e.g. Chris Tucker and 
Andrew Cullison argue that perceptual justifiers are seemings.22 The view we will argue 
for is that—supposing the Composition View is true—perceptual justifiers are neither 
sensory experiences nor constituent seemings, but, instead, the total perceptual seemings 
that they compose.23 So even if the Composition View were true, the epistemology of 
perception could proceed just as if it weren’t. The Composition View draws a distinction 
that, whatever its metaphysical or psychological import, falls below the threshold of 
epistemic significance. 
Our argument combines two familiar lines of thought. The first derives from 
recent discussions of the ‘myth of the given.’24 The second derives from Bonjour’s 
thought experiment about Norman the clairvoyant.25 
         Consider the following passage from Davidson’s ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth 
and Knowledge’: 
  
Suppose we say that sensations themselves, verbalized or not, justify 
certain beliefs that go beyond what is given in sensation. So, under certain 
conditions, having the sensation of seeing a green light flashing may justify the 
belief that a green light is flashing. The problem is to see how the sensation 
justifies the belief. Of course if someone has the sensation of seeing a green light 
flashing, it is likely, under certain circumstances, that a green light is flashing. We 
can say this, since we know of his sensation, but he can’t say it, since we are 
supposing he is justified without having to depend on believing he has the 
sensation. Suppose he believed he didn’t have the sensation. Would the sensation 
still justify him in the belief in an objective flashing green light? 
          
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since 
sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the 
relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause 
some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal 
explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified. (1986, 
311) 
  
Davidson poses two challenges to the view that there are perceptual justifiers—and so to 
Weak Dogmatism. The first is that the mere presence of a prospective perceptual justifier 
in someone’s consciousness does not constitute the basis for a belief. That person would 
have to register its presence. Davidson assumes prospective perceptual justifiers might 
fall below what a person registers. The second is that prospective perceptual justifiers 
cannot stand in justifying relations to beliefs. Such relations only hold between mental 
states with propositional contents. Davidson assumes prospective perceptual justifiers 
lack propositional contents. 
One form of the myth of the given is the idea that prospective perceptual justifiers 
can have the features Davidson takes them to have but be genuine perceptual justifiers 
nonetheless. The literature on perception since Davidson’s paper has shown his 
conception of what prospective perceptual justifiers are to be highly optional.26 There are 
different ways one might depart from Davidson’s conception. Here we are interested in 
the minimum necessary for undermining his arguments. 
Suppose prospective perceptual justifiers are seemings. Whenever you are in such 
a state, some propositions or other seem true to you. If this is so, then Davidson’s 
arguments fail. If things seem a certain way to you, then you are in a state that both partly 
constitutes what you register and that has propositional content. As pointed out above, the 
registration need not enable you to articulate all of that propositional content. Rather, it 
need only take the form of enabling you to make a judgment whose content agrees with 
some part or aspect of that propositional content and do so just by taking the state at face 
value. Say you wonder whether p and are in some state in which it seems to you that p. 
You do not need to form any belief about the state in order to make an informed 
judgment about whether p. You are in a position to judge that p simply by taking what 
seems true to you at face value. The state itself does the informing. Further, the content of 
the state clearly does stand in a logical relation to the judgment that p—because the state 
makes it seem that p and p logically implies p. So if prospective perceptual justifiers are 
seemings, then there is no reason to deny that they can stand in justifying relations to 
judgments or beliefs just because such relations only hold between mental states with 
propositional contents.  
Now let us consider Bonjour’s thought experiment about Norman the clairvoyant. 
Here is how he presents it in ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’: 
  
Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no 
evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a 
cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman 
comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no 
evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from 
his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely reliable. 
(2006, 62)  
  
Does Norman know that the President is in New York City? Bonjour argues that he does 
not know because he lacks justification for believing that the President is in New York 
City. Norman’s belief is the result of a reliable process, but this is not enough to make it a 
reasonable belief for him to have. Something more is required. 
         What more? Suppose Norman saw the President in New York City. Then the 
belief that the President is in New York City would be a reasonable belief for him to 
form. It is worth exploring the gap between these two cases. 
Bonjour’s description of Norman leaves open exactly how one is supposed to 
imagine him. But the typical response is to imagine him just finding himself judging that 
the President is in New York City for reasons entirely beyond his ken. The clairvoyant 
power directly causes the judgment. This is what makes the case problematic. Beliefs that 
result from judgments one just finds oneself making for reasons entirely beyond one’s 
ken are unreasonable. 
On the face of it, the same goes for beliefs that result from judgments made in 
response to felt inclinations, felt attractions, felt impulses, and the like. In these 
intermediate cases there is some experience one might point to—the inclination, the 
attraction, the impulse, etc. So beliefs in these cases do not result from judgments one just 
finds oneself making for reasons entirely beyond one’s ken. But they are not the right 
sorts of experiences to rationalize the resulting belief—assuming one does not have any 
background information to the effect that they are reliable indicators of their content.  
Seeing, however, is different. It is an experience one can point to that does 
rationalize the belief. The reason is that when you see something to be the case—e.g. that 
the President is in New York City—you have an experience that feels as if it makes you 
aware of the portion of the world about which you judge. Your experience does not just 
impress a judgment on you. Rather, it reveals, or at least seems to reveal, something in 
the world that makes the judgment correct. Similar things can be said about the other 
sensory modalities. And in general perceiving things to be a certain way—as opposed to 
having an inclination, attraction, impulse, etc—rationalizes belief because it 
experientially presents portions of the world to us. 
The foregoing lines of thought count in favor of thinking that perceptual justifiers 
must be both seemings and experiences. They must make propositions seem true, lest we 
fall into the myth of the given. They must experientially flesh out those portions of the 
world about which they make propositions seem true, lest they carry no more epistemic 
weight than inclinations, attractions, impulses, etc. We conclude that if the Composition 
View is true, then perceptual justifiers are the total perceptual seemings that sensory 
experiences and seemings compose. Lyons challenges the idea that the composition of 
two non-justifiers might itself be a justifier.27 If the composed state is nothing more than 
the conjunction of its two constituents, then the worry has some force. But in our view 
proponents of the Composition View should argue that the composed state has its own 
distinctive emergent presentational phenomenology.28  
One consequence of this view is that Weak Dogmatism does not fall prey to 
Audi’s worry about the epistemic significance of mere seemings. Mere seemings have no 
epistemic significance. One might worry that this poses a problem to the epistemic 
significance of intellectual seemings—or intuitions. Aren’t intuitions just mere seemings, 
i.e. seemings that are not fleshed out by sensory experiences? Not necessarily. It might be 
true that at least purely intellectual seemings are not fleshed out by sensory experiences. 
But it does not follow that they are mere seemings because they might be fleshed out by 
intellectual experiences.29  
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Notes 	  1	  We will write as if perception has propositional content but we think much of what we say can be 2	  Brogaard says, ‘all seemings then are interpretations of experiences’ (2013b, 277).	  3	  See Tucker (2010, 534-5), Brogaard (2013, 282-3), Audi (2013, f10), and Markie (2013, 256). 4	  Cf. Bealer (1996), Brogaard (2013b), Chudnoff (2011, 2013), Evans (1982), Huemer (2001), Lyons 
(2005, 2015), Searle (1983), Tucker (2010, 2013). 5	  Cf. Smithies (2012). 	  
	  6	  Bengson writes: ‘Whatever a seeming is, it is explicit in the sense that its content is available, at the 
moment in which the content seems true, as the content of a conscious thought fully articulable by its 
subject’ (2015, 24). 7	  See Bengson (2015, 24-5), Brogaard (2013, 283-4), and Lyons (2005, 243-4). 8	  See e.g. Siegel (2006), Bayne (2009), and the papers collected in Hawley and MacPherson (2011). For 
discussion and criticism see Brogaard (2013a) and Reiland (2014). 9	  The term ‘phenomenal contrast’ derives from Siegel (2006). Earlier examples of phenomenal contrast 
arguments include Strawson (1994), Siewert (1998), and Horgan and Tienson (2002). For an argument of 
the sort gestured toward in the text see Chudnoff (2011, 2013). Here is a quick example of the kind of case 
we have in mind. Both expert and novice are fully aware that they are hallucinating. Each hallucinates an 
elm. But while the expert's hallucination includes elm in its content, the novice's does not. Neither is 
inclined to believe the content of her experience. 10	  For example, consider the experience of just the expert in the case described in footnote 9.	  11	  Lyons (2005) emphasizes this point. 12	  According to Lyons (2009, personal communication) there are additional, empirical reasons that do tip 
the scale in favor of portioning out contents across distinct mental states. In particular, there are functional 
and neuroanatomical differences between early and late visual processes. Early visual processes operate on 
low-level information. Late visual processes operate on high-level information.  So maybe one mental state 
with low-level contents corresponds to early visual processes and another mental state with high-level 
contents corresponds to late visual processes. This transition from a distinction between early and late 
stages in visual processing to a distinction between mental states with low-level contents and mental states 
with high-level contents, however, strikes us as too quick. One mental state with both low-level contents 
and high-level contents might result from a process that enriches its content in different stages. 13	  For arguments from blindsight see Tucker (2010, 530) and Brogaard (2013, 279-280). Lyons (2015) 
writes, ‘perceptual seemings without sensations would be like blindsight with confidence’ (159). Tooley 
(2013, 313) doubts that there is any work to be done by ‘seemings’ in explaining blindsight cases. 14	  The only exception we know of here is Lyons (2005), who argues that perceptual seemings are just high-
level outputs of perceptual modules and these outputs are sometimes unconscious. 15	  See, for example, Siewert (1998) and Block (2002). In personal communication Tucker has clarified that 
he rejects this view of these informational states. We do not see what independent grounds there are for 
doing so however. 16	  Brogaard (2013, 280) and Tooley (2013, 313) make similar observations.	  17	  The original study on blindsight is Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders, and Marshall (1974). See also 
Stoerig (1997) for discussion of the evidence on blindsight. On p. 296 of Poppel, Frost, and Held (1973) the 
text reads, ‘actually [the blindsight patients] believed that their performance was always completely 
random.’ 18	  As noted before, Tucker (2010) also argues a blindsighter can have seemings in his or her blind spot. 19	  See Pryor (2000, 536). 20	  See Huemer (2001, 99). 21	  See Conee (1988, 2013). 22	  See Tucker (2010) and Cullison (2013). 23	  Brogaard (2013, 277) argues for a similar view. According to her only seemings that are appropriately 
related to perceptual, introspective, or memory experiences are justifiers. See also Reiland (this volume). 24	  See Sellars (1956) and McDowell (1994). 25	  See Bonjour (1986, 62). 26	  See Evans (1982); Searle (1983, Ch. 2); Peacocke (1992, Ch. 3); Burge (1986); McDowell (1994); Pryor 
(2000); Huemer (2001); Siegel (2010). 27	  Lyons (2009, 70). 	  
	  28	  See Bengson (2015) and Chudnoff (2013) for different takes on the nature of presentational 
phenomenology. 29	  For a development of this sort of view of intuition see Chudnoff (2013). 	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